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1. Ambiguities
Fleck’s ideas did not have an immediate and appreciable impact on the philo­
sophical debate. As is well known, his 1935 masterpiece Genesis and Development 
o f a Scientific Fact] has been rediscovered in the 1960s by Thomas Kuhn. One con- 
sequence o f this temporary marginalization has been the ambiguous (non uniform) 
reception o f his ideas. This is nothing surprising, sińce rarely the interpretation pro- 
duced by commentators coincide. However, Fleck became famous only post mor- 
tem and, consequently, he did not have the possibility to clarify his position concer- 
ning some important epistemological problems.
The effort I will produce in order to collocate Fleck’s ideas in the correct co- 
gnitive space is not merely to satisfy idle curiosity. The debate in the philosophy and 
sociology o f science (hereafter -  PSS) has probably never been so harsh as in this 
end of millenium. In recent centuries, single scholars and/or entire schools of 
thought have engaged in various disputes over different (sometimes conflicting, 
sometimes mutually enriching) images o f science. More recently the situation has 
significantly changed: in the present-day debate, not only a particular image of 
science is put in question, but science itself as institution and as a specific type of 
knowledge is challenged2. And the reaction to this radical attack in not less radical3.
In the past the main aim of the PSS was establishing, rationally and empiri- 
cally, the boundaries between science and other forms o f knowledge. This distinc-
1 L. Fleck, Genesis and Developnient o f a Scientific Fact, Chicago University Press, Chi­
cago 1979.
“ See, for instance: P. K. Feyerabend, Against Method. Outline o f An Anarchist Theory of 
Knowledge, Verso, London 1978; T. J. Pinch and H. M. Collins, Is Anti-Science Non-Scien- 
ce?, in “Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook”, Vol. 3: 221-250; and T. J. Pinch and H. M. 
Collins, Private Science and Public Knowledge: The Committee for the Scientific Investiga- 
tion o f the Claims o f the Paranormal and Its Use o f the Literaturę, in “Social Studies of 
Science” 14, 1984:521-546.
3 Among the most resolute defenders of Science and Reason (with Capital letters) there is 
Mario Bunge. Cf. M. Bunge, In Praise o f Intolerance to Charlatanism in Academia, in “The 
Flight ffom Science and Reason”, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 775, 
June 1996.
-  284  -
tion has, in principle, also had to be functional for the detection and refutation of 
pseudo-science, that is, o f non-scientific knowledge presented under the denomi- 
nation o f “science” in order to get social and academic credits. Today pseudo- 
science seems to be a minor problem. Science has gained such a bad name that it is 
sometimes easier to obtain credits by presenting ideas explicitly devoid o f any con- 
nection with laboratories, experiments, mathematics, and rigorous reasoning. Now 
the main distinction in the market o f ideas seems to be that between science and 
antiscience, or more precisely between pro-science PSS and anti-science PSS.
To understand why Fleck represents a peculiar case-study in this panorama, 
it is enough noticing that: a) his work has been edited, promoted, and defended by 
Robert Merton4; b) many “militants” of the pro-science and anti-science parties 
name themselves, respectively, Mertonians and post-Mertonians; c) the post-Mer- 
tonians (also self—identified as constructivists and relativists) consider Fleck as one 
o f their main masters. In sum, Merton is taken as the godfather o f the pro-science 
party and Fleck as the godfather o f the anti-science one, but Fleck’s thought has 
been promoted by Merton! This seemingly rebus shows that a correct interpretation 
and evaluation o f Fleck’s ideas is still far to come.
My main thesis is that Fleck occupies an intermediate (though precise) cogni- 
tive space between Merton and the new radical schools in the PSS. Surely Fleck’s 
approach can be seen in many respects as an anticipation o f the relativist/cons- 
tructivist program coming to the fore in the 1980s, but there are also points of 
convergence with Merton’s view which deserve to be adequately emphasized. As 
well, there are non-negligible differences between Fleck and his more radical fol- 
lowers which need to be underlined.
2. Triadic vs. Dual Sociological Epistemology
The following table is a schematized representation o f my reading o f the 
twentieth century epistemological debate.
At the beginning o f the century the epistemological approach which domi- 
nates the debate about the foundation o f science is rooted in the empiricist tradition 
o f Bacon, Mili and Comte. This approach, often labeled “positivistic” undervalues 
or totally ignore the role and the characteristics o f the knowing subject in science. 
By ignoring the knowing subject, positivists neglect the role of genius as well as the 
role o f extra-cognitive factors (e. g. the influence of the social milieu) in scientific 
research. Carnap’s Aufbau is the last serious and systematic attempt to reconstruct 
human knowledge only by mean o f data and logie. As is well known, the failure of
4 Together with Thaddeus Trenn.
5 R. Carnap, The Logical Structure ofthe World, University of California Press, Berkeley 
and Los Angeles 1967.
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this attempt has been recognized by Camap himself6. Black arrows in the table are 
to indicate the first breakthrough in the history o f epistemology: from dual episte- 
mology to triadic epistemology.
Type of Metascience Scholars
1 Object-to-be-known —> resulting knowledge Bacon, Mili, Comte (pre- 
ceding centuries)
Carnap (1920s)
iii
2 Object-to-be-known —► rational knowing subject —> 
resulting knowledge
Popper (1930s) 
Meyerson (1930s) 
Koertge (1970s)
3 Object-to-be-known —► rational/social knowing 
subject —► resulting knowledge
Merton (1930s)
Bunge, Lakatos (1960s)
4 Object-to-be-known —> social knowing subject —► 
resulting knowledge
Fleck (1930s) 
Kuhn (1960s)
& a a
5 Social knowing subject —► resulting knowledge Feyerabend (1970s) 
Bloor, Collins, Knorr, 
Latour, Woolgar (1980s)
Triadic epistemology introduces the knowing subject as a non-negligible 
factor that mediates between object-to-be-known and resulting knowledge. It is 
however necessary to qualify more precisely the different types o f triadic episte­
mology, by distinguishing between rational, social/rational, and purely social kno­
wing subject. Popper’s logie o f discovery is altemative to dual (traditional) episte­
mology because it recognizes the role of the knowing subject in the form of genius 
in science. Only geniuses like Galileo, Newton, Einstein, Darwin could formulate 
bold conjectures able to revolutionize science. A set o f methodological rules will 
never produce good science alone. Popper’s knowing subject uses imagination, but 
he/she is still assumed to be a purely rational one. When social factors interfere, it 
follows that the resulting knowledge is not “genuine”. Since the 1960s, Popper’s 
metascience has been defended and developed in different directions by numberless 
philosophers8.
6 The recognition of the failure is the demonstration that positivists are sometimes less 
dogmatic than their enemies.
7 K. R. Popper, The Logic ofScientific Discovery, Hutchinson, London 1959.
8 Among Popperians it is worth mentioning: Noretta Koerge (in America), Adam Grobler 
(in Poland), Dario Antiseri, Angelo Petroni, Marcello Pera (in Italy), Hans Albert (in Germa­
ny), William Bartley 111 (Great Britain).
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Already sińce the 1930s we encounter another version o f triadic epistemo- 
logy: that underlying Merton’s sociology o f science. Merton assumes that the kno- 
wing subject is fundamentally rational, but he is also aware that social factors play 
asignificant role in the formation o f scientific knowledge (true knowledge inclu- 
ded). Since the 1960s, triadic sociological-and-rational epistemology have been 
independently developed by professional philosophers o f science like Bunge9 and 
Lakatos10. The difference between these two scholars is that Bunge is conscious of 
the convergence between his studies in the philosophy o f science and Merton’s stu- 
dies in the sociology o f science, while Lakatos considers Merton closer to Kuhn and 
Polany i.
Indeed, there is a third type o f triadic epistemology which tends to unde- 
restimate the role o f reason in scientific research and focuses almost exclusively on 
the social/historical character o f the knowing subject. Again, this perspective emer- 
ges in the 1930s, but conquers a major popularity in the 1960s. Fleck’s 1935 Gene­
sis o f  Development o f a Scientific Fact is the point o f arrival o f a long tradition of 
thought in Poland, going back to Kramsztyk and the “Polish philosophico-medical 
school” 11. Kuhn’s 1962 The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions]1, directly inspired 
by Fleck’s work, is now seen as the manifesto o f this type o f theory o f knowledge.
Yet, triadic epistemology (in its three versions) is not the last stage o f trans- 
formation o f the theory of knowledge. White arrows are to indicate a second im- 
portant breakthrough in the history o f metascience. Since the 1970s, and more radi- 
cally in the 1980s, a fifth form of metascience has emerged. It is again a dual epi­
stemology. However, contrarily to positivistic metascience, the resulting knowledge 
is assumed to be produced entirely by the social knowing subject, and not by the 
object-to-be-known. Between the first and the fifth type o f metascience there are, 
nonetheless, points o f convergence. For instance, both epistemologies neglect the 
role o f genius. The first philosopher o f science who tended to neglect the role o f 
objective reality in the creation o f knowledge was Feyerabend. Afterwards his posi- 
tion has been more and more radicalized by the post-Mertonians sociologists of 
scientific knowledge. Latour and Woolgar’s Laboratory Lifeu and David Bloor’s
9 See M. Bunge, Social Science Under Debate: A Philosophical Perspective, University 
of Toronto Press, Toronto 1998; and M. Bunge, A Critical Examination of the New Sociology 
of Science, in “Philosophy of the Social Sciences”, Vol. 21 No. 4, December 1991, and Vol. 
22 No. 1, March 1992.
10 See 1. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1978.
11 Cf. I. Lówy, From Z Kramsztyk to L. Fleck: Medical Observations and the Construc- 
tion of Clinical Facts, in “The Polish Sociological Bulletin”, No. 1, 1989: 39—48.
12 T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago 1962.
13 B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific 
Facts, Sage, Beverly Hills 1979.
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Knowledge and Social Im agery4 are usually taken as exemplars o f this trend. This 
last form o f theory o f knowledge, very ofiten, characterizes itself as “antiscientific”. 
Indeed, these scholars intend to revalue alternative forms o f knowledge and practi- 
ces like: magie, miracles, witchcraft, astrology, telekinesis and paranormal pheno- 
mena in generał. Brief, everything banned by modern science as superstition.
4. Fleck and Merton
Differences. According to Merton the success o f science in explaining objec- 
tive reality is evident. The interplay o f human reason, sophisticated techniques of 
research, particular social and cultural structures, genius o f some individuals, chan- 
ce, and other factors has contributed to make ó f science one o f the most successful 
human enterprises. Merton maintains that “ [s]peaking o f the progress o f science in 
this concrete historical sense means only that the contemporary physical and life 
Sciences can account with more widespread coherence, precision, and often pre- 
dictability for all the natural phenomena which the ancients tried to account for, and 
much else besides, including an indefinitely wide rangę o f natural phenomena 
which were not even detectable” 15.
Fleck seems instead to be much more skeptical concerning the progress of 
science: “I do not think that today’s science is closer to the objective picture o f the 
world than the science o f 100 years ago. On the other hand, I am sure that today’s 
science is closer to our world o f today, while the science o f 100 years ago was clo­
ser to what was then the world of the creators of science... to our grandsons, the 
science of 1940 will not seem much better than that o f 1840” 16.
Similarities. This profound difference notwithstanding, Merton and Fleck can 
be assimilated for the fact that both subscribe to a triadic sociological epistemo- 
logy17. Evidence that Fleck believes in the existence o f an objective reality, external 
and independent from the human and social world are not absent, as the following 
paragraph demonstrates.
14 D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, Routledge and & Kegan Paul, London 1976.
15 This Merton’s quotation is found in P. Sztompka, Robert K. Merton: An Intellectual 
Profde, MacMillan, Hong Kong 1986: 274. Sztompka’s reference is to Merton, Progress in 
Science? A Shapeless Cloud of a Question, lecture delivered in 1982 at Tempie University 
Colloquium in Philadelphia (mimeographed) pp. 1-20. The main works written by Merton 
are: Social Theory. and Social Structure, The Free Press, New York 1968; The Sociology of 
Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
1973; Sociological Ambivalence and Other Essays, The Free Press, New York 1976; Science, 
Technology andSociety in Seventeenth Centmy EnglandHarper & Row, New York 1970.
16 L. Fleck, Problems in the Science of Science, in Cohen and Schnelle (eds.), Cognition 
and Fact, Reidel, Dordrecht 1986: 116-117.
17 This seems to be also Sztompka’s opinion. See P. Sztompka, Robert K. Merton..., 
op. cit.: 76-77.
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“The origin o f the number 16 for the atomie weight o f oxygen is almost con- 
sciously conventional and arbitrary. But if 16 is assumed as the atomie weight for O, 
oxygen, o f necessity the atomie weight o f H, hydrogen, will inevitably be 1. 008. 
This means that the ratio o f the two weights is a passive element o f knowledge”18.
The existence o f passive elements o f knowledge is an “axiom” for those 
philosophers who qualify themselves as rationalist and realist, but not every philo- 
sophers are ready to accept postulates like the existence o f an extemal world and the 
independence ofth is world from human linguistic manipulations.
3. Fleck and the ReIativist/Constructivist Program
Differences. There is a large number o f scholars and schools that self-identi- 
fy as relativists or constructivists. These approaches sometimes differ significantly 
and thus should be adequately distinguished. The most radical school is probably 
that o f Collins, Travis, and Pinch (authors that we can symbolize with the brief lo- 
cution ‘Bath group,’ sińce their ideas developed at Bath University, in the United 
Kingdom). Besides the Bath group one encounters the Edinburgh group, including 
figures like David Bloor, Barry Barnes, Steven Shapin, Donald MacKenzie, Bill 
Harvey, and Andy Pickering, and insisting that science is socially determined and 
that all scientific programs and results can be explained (in part or at all) as the re- 
sult o f social ‘interests’. Then, there is also the constructivist program followed by 
Krohn, Whitley, and Knorr-Cetina, which does not consider relativism as a necessa- 
ry assumption19 and assumes that science is practical, local, and constructed (and 
not theoretical, universal, and ‘discovered’ as it is traditionally postulated). Finally, 
there is on the scene also the group adopting “discourse analysis” methodology and 
mainly represented by Mulkay, Gilbert, and Woolgar.
Here, considering the parameters o f my paper, I will simply label all these 
schools and scholars as “the relativist/constructivist program”(hereafiter -  RCP).
I am however aware that not all of them would accept to be put in the same category20.
The mentioned scholars variously and ambiguously oscillate between dual 
sociological epistemology (social knowing subject -»  resulting knowledge) and 
triadic sociological epistemology (object-to-be-know n —» social knowing subject
18 L. Fleck, Genesis..., op. cit.: 83.
19 K. D. Knorr-Cetina, The Constructmst Programme in the Sociology of Science: Retreat 
orAchance? in “Social Studiesof Science”, London and Beverly Hills, Vol. 12,1982: 321.
20 As Mulkay and Gilbert opportunely underline, “there is a tendency to oversimplify in- 
tellectual boundaries in the course of lively academic debate. No doubt [Gieryn] ...is right in 
suggesting that commentators have previously often used the term ‘Mertonian’ rather care- 
lessly in devising a background within which the originality of their own work can become 
evident. It seems likely that we all characterize intellectual movements to which we do not 
belong in ways which seem bizarre to those named insiders” -  M. Mulkay and G. N. Gilbert, 
What is the Ultimate Question? Some Remarks in Defence of the Analysis of Scientific Di­
scourse, in “Social Studies of Science”, London and Beverly Hills, Vol. 12, 1982: 309.
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->  resulting knowledge). Here I will stress more on the radical angle o f the RCP. 
Gieryn lists a series o f sentences by Collins which make think the relativist position 
as “a step back to ‘sociological reductionism’, an exemplary case o f the fallacy of 
‘nothing but-ism ’”21. And these sentences seem not to Ieave many doubts about the 
radicality o f Collins’ position: “the natural world has a smali or non-existent role in 
the construction o f scientific knowledge”; “to press the account forward requires 
that it be taken that the phenomenon itself does not dictate the outcome o f the argu­
ment”; “ [We are] refusing to put any demands at all upon reality, to circumscribe 
possible individual beliefs”; “nothing outside o f courses o f linguistics, conceptual 
and social behavior can affect the outcome of these arguments”22.
To be sure, Collins seems to assume that an external world does exists (or 
could exist), but humans are considered unable to grasp any knowledge about it. 
Zybertowicz takes even a more radical position. He argues that: a) “the scientific 
cognition could not evolve as a legitimate form o f activity, unless it has become 
socially recognized that there is something out there to be searched for...”; b) “there 
are symbolic manipulations that can actually perform expected changes in the phy- 
sical properties o f various objects”23. If I interpret correctly these sentences, Zyber­
towicz is ready to exclude that outside the social world there is an independent natu­
ral world. This exclusion provides an epistemological legitimation for magie, mi- 
racles, telekinesis, telepathy, and other paranormal phenomena. Words are not only 
to represent things, they are also to change things, for the mental (and so conceptual, 
linguistic) world is not sharply disconnected from the natural world.
I think that Fleck differs from Collins because, as we have seen, he assumes 
that there are passive elements in our knowledge and, moreover, he assumes that we 
can more or less precisely understand where naturę intrudes in science. The kno- 
wing subject establishes conventionally the atomie weight o f oxygen; an extemal 
and independent natural world establishes the ratio o f the weights o f oxygen and 
hydrogen. Then, he differs from Zybertowicz because he never explicitly says that 
magie, astrology, alchemy are (or could be) “true knowledge”. He just says that 
these forms o f non-scientific knowledge are to be understood in relation to a parti- 
cular thought-style, which is located in a specific historical time and social space. 
Often these non-scientific assumptions constitute a source o f error, but sometimes 
they help science to develop and, consequently, they cannot be derided or taken 
only as a shame of the human kind.
21 T. F. Gieryn, Relatmst/Constructmst Programmes in the Sociology of Science: Re- 
dundance and RetreaU in “Social Studies of Science”, London and Beverly Hills, Vol. 12, 
1982: 287.
22 Ibid.
23 A. Zybertowicz, Theory of Culture, Stages of Social Cognitive Change and the Para­
normal Phenomena, in „Studia Metodologiczne”, z. 9, 1999: 35-70.
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“ ...Poignant jokes against Pasteur circulated. Liebig, blinded by his precon- 
ceived ideas, was unable to perceive some easily demonstrable and quite distinct 
phenomena supporting Pasteur’s claim.
It would, however, be a mistake to assume that the style o f thinking, and the 
leading generał ideas or images (Gestalten) derived from this style, are always ra- 
ther a hindrance in the search for truth and a source o f error. The whole o f modem 
knowledge o f infection and infectious diseases originates in very ancient beliefs in 
analogy between putrefaction and disease, and in smali ‘animalcules’ as a cause o f 
both...
Ali these ‘ingenuous intuitions’ which existed before any empirical proof, 
and stemmed from an old pre-scientific D enkstil, acted throughout the ages as 
a propelling force for a host o f discoveries. It is doubtful whether our knowledge of 
infectious disease would have made such progress without these ‘intuitions’” .
As we can see, Fleck still uses categories like “truth,” “error,” “discoveries,” 
“progress” which are banned in the vocabulary o f postmodemists. He never says 
that truth and illusion are indistinguishable24 and, moreover, he ofiten qualifies 
scientific knowledge as “true knowledge”. What he refuses is the qualification of 
other forms o f knowledge as ridiculous superstitions or meaningless ideas.
There is, then, another important difference between Fleck and present con- 
structivists: Fleck was a microbiologist turned sociologist. This is to say that he was 
(in principle) competent to perform a sociological analysis o f microbiology. Latour 
and Woolgar are instead anthropologists tout court, claiming that their ignorance of 
natural science is a point o f strength and not o f weakness o f their studies. They 
comment on the content o f biological theories, without having any basie knowledge 
o f biology and chemistry. They are in that situation defined by Bunge as will/ul or 
postmodern ignorance25. I think that sociologists o f science can focus indifferently 
on the social structure o f the scientific community (as Merton mainly does) or on the 
very content o f science (as Fleck mainly does). But by being a pure sociologist, one 
can perform only the first type o f study. In the second case a further specialization is 
needed. A sociologist o f bacteriology must be a sociologist and a bacteriologist. An 
anthropologist o f neurobiology must be an anthropologist and a neurobiologist, and 
so on. Otherwise the sociology o f science will be only a caricature o f a science.
Similarities. There are many similarities between Fleck’s approach and the 
RCP. The most striking one is the negation o f the role of genius in science. Indivi-
24 Cf. Fleck, Problems of the Science of Science, in Cohen and Schnelle (eds.), Cogni- 
tion..., op. cit.: 123.
25 “[W]illful or postmodern ignorance is the deliberate refusal to leam items relevant to 
one’s interests. Example: the refusal of the psychotherapist and the philosopher of mind to 
leam some experimental psychology and neuropsychology; the refusal of the literary critic 
with some sociological interests to learn some sociology; and the refusal of the philosopher of 
science to learn a bit of the science he pontificates about. Ali these are instances of willful 
ignorance. This is the only intolerable kind of ignorance, for it is a fonu of dishonesty” -  M. 
Bunge, In Praise oflntolerance..., op. cit.: 108.
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duaPs cognitive capability almost disappears in Fleck’s metascience as well as in 
relativist/constructivist PSS. The thought-style not only influences the outcome of 
scientific inquiry, it fully determines the very content o f observation26.
5. Taking Position
As we have seen, I assume that Fleck (together with Kuhn) represents one of 
five different modes to interpret the problem o f scientific cognition. In this finał 
remark I intend to take position in the controversy. I personally support the third 
epistemological approach presented in this paper, namely that proposed by Merton, 
Bunge, and Lakatos, among others. In other words, I believe that: a) there exists true 
and false  knowledge (or, more precisely, that there is knowledge which has a greater 
content o f truth than other); b) scientific knowledge contains active elements (hy- 
pothesis, conjectures) as well as passive elements (facts); c) it is worth distinguis- 
hing between constructs (concepts, models, theories, etc.) and fa c ts : science is 
a linguistic construction; objective reality is not; d) a certain type o f scientific reason 
(historically emerged) plays a fundamental role in the creation/discovery o f true 
knowledge; d) social factors play a role in the creation/discovery o f true as well as 
false knowledge; e) social structures influence, but not fully determine the individual 
knowing subject; f) genius plays a role in the formulation o f conjectures, hypothe- 
ses, models, theories, concepts, and the ways o f testing them; g) scientific constructs 
are in principle universal and only contingently relative\ h) there is progress in 
science; i) frequency, rangę, and precision o fpredictions, logical consistence betwe­
en different scientific discoveries, and technological applications are indices of 
scientific progress; 1) all these assumptions as well as their negation have a (partial) 
metaphysical content, that is, a non demonstrable core.
On these assumptions I found my criticism o f Fleck’s metascientific creed. 
He asserts that 1940 science is not closer to objective reality than 1840 science. Ho- 
wever, his negation o f progress is based on a peculiar way o f reasoning. He assumes 
that, sińce science will change again in futurę, to his grandsons 1940 science will not 
appear much better than that produced one century before. A mathematical meta- 
phor could represent well this perspective. In a progressive sequence o f numbers, 
number 5 is “bigger” than number 4. Nonetheless, observers can clearly perceive the 
difference only by being located “near” the mentioned numbers (say, in 0, or in 4, or 
ino , etc.). If the observer locates him/herself near oo (infinite), the difference betwe­
en 4 and 5 will just disappear. Whatever number is non-comparable with oo and, 
consequently, whatever number is “equivalenf’.
I think that this way o f reasoning is a mere sophism. It is comparable with 
Zenone’s paradox o f Achilles and the tortoise. As well as it is impossible to explain 
motion with elementary logie (as already Aristotle remarked), it is impossible to 
explain the progress o f science with elementary logie. None the less, progress does
26 Cf. Fleck, Crisis in Science, in Cohen and Schnelle, Cognition..., op. cit.: 155.
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exist. It is in front o f our eyes as well as motion o f bodies. In order to explain the 
Iatter we had to develop a very sophisticated dynamics (based on mathematical tools 
unknown by the Greeks). I assiune that present epistemology does not explain 
scientific progress in a fully satisfactoiy way, because it is still in a rudimentary 
stage.
In more specific terms (by being one o f the grandsons mentioned by Fleck) 
I feel entitled to express my opinion about the progress o f medicine. To me, the 
science o f 1940 seems closer to the objective picture o f reality than the science of 
1840. 1 can say more: 1940 science seems to be much closer to the truth than 1935 
science, that is, that possessed by Fleck in the year o f publication o f his masterpiece. 
A few years after the appearing o f his book, in fact, we discovered that: a) the anti- 
bodies-antigen (Ab-Ag) reaction is not necessarily specific (that is, a serum conta- 
ining an antitreponema Ab does not react only with treponema); b) Ag does not have 
to be necessarily a protein; c) lipids can be the support o f immunological specificity 
(in the 1930s, the few lipids whose structure had been established were lecithin, 
cholesterol or sphingomyelin and they were found in most o f the tissue analyzed; 
consequently, it was hard to suspect that lipids are immunogenic); d) the factor re- 
sponsible for the reaction with serum from syphilitic patients was a phospholipid 
(isolated in 1942 by Pangborn and called cardiolipin); e) cardiolipin is a constituent 
o f treponema, but it is also present on various tissue (that is why the reaction was 
possible on non-infected liver homogenate); f) it is possible to circumvent this anti- 
complementary interference by combining cardiolipin with lecithin. In sum, some 
years after the appearing o f Fleck’s book, immunologists discovered the Chemical 
structure o f the antigen involved in the Wassermann reaction. Moreover, Fleming 
discovered penicillin, which eradicates completely the disease. Hence, Fleck’s skep- 
ticism about the progress o f bacteriology and immunology can be also understood in 
the light o f the knowledge of his time.
O f course, we cannot assert that these discoveries are definitive (we can grasp 
truth, not certainty), but similarly we cannot assert that they are o f necessity non- 
definitive. As Bunge convincingly remarks “[p]hilosophers have taken care o f episte- 
mological relativism or skepticism with the help o f purely logical arguments or by 
listing some o f the last findings o f science, such as the heliocentric theory of the 
planetary system, the circulation o f the blood, the existence o f electromagnetic 
fields, atoms, and genes, and the evolution o f biospecies. These and most o f the truth 
o f logie and mathematics are surely some of the many fuli (not just partial) and eter- 
nal truths established sińce the beginning o f the modern era -  pace such distingu- 
ished skeptics as Hume, Engels, and Popper”27. Till when these theories: remain 
non-refuted (in spite o f the fact that scientists are free to produce attempts at 
refutation); provide precise predictions; are proved to be logically consistent; 
constitute the basis for effective technological applications, we are allowed to 
consider them as true.
27 M. Bunge, A Critical Examination..., op. cit.: 50.
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Without a doubt, treponema pallidum, cardiolipin, antigen, sphingomyelin, 
lecithin, cholesterol, and penicillin are socially constructedconcepts. Natives of, say, 
New Guinea could not conceive o f the problem of syphilis in these terms. They are 
social constructs as well as the previous theories: a) syphilis is caused “ex conjunc- 
tione Saturn i et Iovis in tertia scorpionis facie in 23 gradu transacta 1484 tumque 
aliarum stellarum fixarum configuratione tunc temporis simul concorrentium ...” 
(brief, astrological explanation); b) syphilis is caused by the will o f God, who wants 
to punish sinners (brief, theological explanation). None the less, these concepts and 
theories appear to us as non-equivalent constructs.
I am sure that even the most radical relativist could accept to have sexual in- 
tercourse when there is a “conjunctione Saturni et Iovis in tertia scorpionis”, but 
he/she would never allow a physician to inject a suitable quantity o f treponema pal­
lidum in his/her blood. This means that we have good reasons to conclude that the 
theoiy o f germs disease is socially constructed better than astrology.
